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HOUSING DISCRIMINATION-THE
RESPONSE OF LAW
MARTIN E. SLOANE*
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Housing Discrimination North and South
It has been understood for many years that housing discrimina-
tion is actively practiced in the North.' Since the end of World
War I, when the emigration of Negroes from the rural South to
northern urban centers noticeably accelerated, Negroes have been
increasingly ghettoized and shut off from the main stream of north-
ern city life. The growth in the post-World War II years of all-
white northern suburbs, from which Negroes have been almost
entirely excluded, did not represent a new trend, but rather an in-
tensification of long-standing patterns and practices.' These pat-
terns and practices did not go unobserved by civil rights commen-
tators.3 To the extent that the Nation was concerned with matters
of civil rights in past years, it was clearly demonstrated that housing
discrimination was a problem both North and South.
In recent years, however, with the great surge of national at-
tention on civil rights generally, housing discrimination has been
discussed largely in a northern context.4 In fact, it has come popu-
larly to be viewed almost exclusively as a northern problem-one
which the South, despite all its other civil rights problems, has
* Office of General Counsel, Housing and Home Finance Agency. Former
Chief, Housing Section, U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights. The views expressed
in this article are those of the author and do not purport to represent those
of the Housing & Home Finance Agency or the U.S. Commission on Civil
Rights.
"See, e.g., MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMA 348-53, 618-27 (1944);
WEAVER, THE NEGRO GHETTO (1948); Groner & Helfield, Race Discrimina-
tion in Housing, 57 YALE L.J. 426 (1948).
'Even prior to World War I, patterns of residential segregation by race
could clearly be defined. See 4 U.S. COMM'N ON CmIL RIGHTS REPORT,
HOUSING 1961, at 9-10 (1961) [hereinafter cited as 1961 Comm'N REPORT].
'Mayor Richardson Dilworth of Philadelphia, for example, coined the
phrase, "white noose," to characterize the ring of virtually all-white suburbs
surrounding the central city.
'See, e.g., Robison, Housing-The Northern Civil Rights Frontier, 13
W. REs. L. REV. 101 (1961), where the author accounts for this phenomenon
on grounds that housing has become the chief civil rights issue outside the
South.
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fortuitously managed to, avoid. Incidents gsid't as ther disturbance
in Folcroft, Pennsylvania, when a Negro family moved into a previ-
ously all-white community; the sit-in demonstrations- at- William
Levitt's Belair housing development in the Maryland suburbs of
Washington, D. C., and the overall attack in the North on neighbor-
hood school districting, have been widely publicized. In the deep
South, however, where Negroes are now militantly protesting
against the deprivations of centuries, little is heard concerning the
denial of housing opportunities. But the lack of publicity does not
mean that the problem is nonexistent. Housing discrimination is
not alien to the southern portion of the United States.
Although racial zoning ordinances have long been held unconsti-
tutional,5 they are, nontheless, still maintained by some southern
communities as *an effective Eontrol on individual housing choice.6
Even in a city like Atlanta, renowned for having successfully main-
tained a racial modus vivendi,7 it will be recalled that quite recently
a wall was erected between Negro and white sections of the city.
Also, southern home builders, when polled by their trade organiza-
tion, exhibited a markedly greater reluctance to sell on a non-
discriminatory basis than their northern counterparts.' In short,
the problem is not one uniquely indigenous to the North. In both
1959 and 1961 the basic finding of the United States Commission
on Civil Rights-"Housing. . . seems to be the one commodity in
the American market that is not freely available on equal terms to
'Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
'As recently as 1951, a racial zoning ordinance enacted by the city of
Birmingham, Alabama, was tested in the courts and found to be unconstitu-
tional. City of'Birmingham v. Monk, 185 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 341 U.S. 940 (1951). In Jimerson v. City of Bessemer, Civil No.
10054, N.D. Ala., August, 1962, a federal district court noted as late as
August 1962 that the city of Bessemer had repealed its racial zoning
ordinances "several years ago."
See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTs, RFPORT 1959, at 419 (1959)'
[hereinafter cited as 1959 COmm'N REPORT], where the United States Com-
mission on Civil Rights generally praised the housing conditions that pre-
vailed in Atlanta, although noting that opportunities existed largely on a
segregated basis.
' In a poll of 15,000 member builders by the National Association of
Home Builders in July, 1962, concerning the economic effect a housing, order
would have, less than 6,000 replies were received, 2,100 of which were from
southern builders, who were more firmly convinced that dire consequences
would follow an order's issuance than their northern counterparts. More
than one half of the responses indicating a decrease in building activity
following issuance of an -order were from the South.
iq j] ,
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everyone who can afford to pay"---was made on the basis of in-
vestigations and hearings conducted throughout the country."0 No
section of the country was found to be immune.
B. Housing and Government
The elements that make up the housing industry-both North
and South-are largely private and, in theory, it is private entre-
preneurs who make the key decisions that determine where housing
will be built and to whom it will be sold. But pervading every
aspect of the housing industry and, indeed, controlling virtually all
of its activities, and supporting the entire structure, is government-
local, state, and federal. For example, the home builder may build
only in accordance with zoning laws, building codes, and other
appropriate local ordinances. The federal government offers him
the inestimable benefit of its mortgage insurance and loan guarantee
programs,1' while holding him to a high professional standard of
performance. The real estate broker is licensed by the state and
held to an ethical standard in his dealings with the public. In addi-
tion, the federal government, through trademark laws, protects his
exclusive right to use the term, "Realtor," as against those brokers
not affiliated with the National Association of Real Estate Boards.12
1961 Co rm'x REPoRT 1; 1959 Comm'N REPORT 534.
'
0 The Commission has held hearings and conferences relating to housing
in the following cities: New York, Atlanta, Chicago, Los Angeles, San
Francisco, Detroit, Little Rock, Cleveland, Newark, Memphis, Phoenix and
Indianapolis.
" These are administered by the Federal Housing Administration, a
constituent agency of the Housing and Home Finance Agency, and the
Veterans Administration. The benefit to builders has been described by
one court as follows: "[FHA provides] a ready means by which they can
market their respective products. . . . [The builder] can count on his
market, rather than simply invest his time, labor and money in developing
property and then hope for buyers who can persuade a lender to advance
enough to enable them to purchase with no security other than the property
itself." Ming v. Horgan, 3 RACE REL. L. REP. 693, 695 (Super. Ct., Sacra-
mento, Calif. June 23, 1958). William Levitt, one of the country's largest
builders, testified before Congress on the importance to builders of the mort-
gage insurance program: "[W]e are 100 percent dependent on the Govern-
ment. Whether this is right or wrong it is a fact." Hearings on H.R.
5611, Before a Subcommittee on Housing of the House Committee on Bank-
ing and Currency, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 566 (1957).
"Largely because of the exclusion of Negro brokers by many local real
estate boards associated with the national organization, a separate real
estate brokers association was established-The National Association of
Real Estate Brokers. Brokers affiliated with this organization are styled
"Realtists." See Hearings Before the U.S. Comnn on Civil Rights on
[Vol. 42
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Further, the mortgage lending institution is regulated by one or
more state or federal agencies and is typically benefited by federal
insurance of its accounts or deposits.1
This partial catalog gives some indication of the extent of gov-
ernmental involvement in housing and of the basic fact that housing
is a matter of governmental concern. The remainder of this article
will be devoted to an evaluation of the impact of government on the
various aspects of housing discrimination-the constitutional duty
imposed upon government to prevent such discrimination and the
response of state and federal government to the problem in terms
of the exercise of governmental power.
II. THE PROTECTION OF THE CONSTITUTION
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment guaran-
tees to the American people equal treatment at the hands of the
state or any of its agencies or instrumentalities. 4 This same guaran-
tee applies with equal force to the federal government., 5 Moreover,
the right to acquire, enjoy, own and dispose of housing and land
holds a place of particular importance within the ambit of protection
under the Constitution. As the Supreme Court of the United States
has noted: "Equality in the enjoyment of property rights was re-
garded by the framers of that [Fourteenth] Amendment as an essen-
tial precondition to the realization of other basic civil rights and
liberties which the Amendment was intended to guarantee."' s
It is equally clear, however, that the Constitution offers no pro-
tection against private discriminatory conduct.'1 This principle,
first enunciated in the Civil Rights Cases's in 1883, has been con-
sistently adhered to by the Supreme Court in the eighty years that
have followed. "[T]he action inhibited by the first section [Equal
Protection Clause] of the Fourteenth Amendment is only such
action as may fairly be said to be that of the States. That Amend-
Housing in Washington, D.C. 190 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Washington
Hearings].8 For a detailed discussion regarding federal supervision over mortgage
lending institutions see 1961 COMM'N REPORT 27-53.
" Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S.
3 (1883).
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
"Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 10 (1948).
"Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
" 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
19631
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ment erects'no.shield against merely private'conduct, however dis-
crimrinatoiy or wrongful.""9  -
The two critical issues, then, for purposes of defiting the scope
of protection under the. equal protection -clause, are: equality and
government responsibility. :In housing, as in many other areas
where government and private enterprise are complexly intertwined,
the issue of government responsibility has thus far proven trouble-
some to the courts. The issue of equality, on the other hand, is
much further along toward settlement, at least in terms of basic
ground rules. After nine years, it is clear that on this issue the
School Segregation Cases2" represent a pivotal point in the develop-
ment of constitutional law. There, the court rejected once and for
all the inhumanity of governmentally enforced segregation by race, as
"inherently unequal." It would appear that at least for this purpose,
the dictum of Mr. Justice Harlan (the elder) has become law: "Our
Constitution is color-blind."'"
In terms of assessing government responsibility, we may already
have reached a similar turning point in Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority,12 where the Supreme Court indicated that the
constitutional obligation of the state may not be satisfied through
mere passive acquiescence to discriminatory conduct by private
parties with whom it is involved. It has been only two years since
Burton, but there are already signs that it is a landmark case of
sizeable proportions.3 In 1959, the United States Commission on
Civil Rights concluded that "Federal decisional law in the field of
discrimination in housing is in a state of flux."24 While this is still
largely true, there are some settled areas, and Burton and its im-
mediate descendants are in the process of clarifying still others.
A. Racial Zoning
One area of law in the field of housing discrimination that has
long been settled involves racial zoning ordinances. As early as
"9 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948).
20 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (dissenting opinion).
22365 U.S. 715 (1961).
2" See, e.g., Hampton v. City of Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 320 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 911 (1962); Smith v. Holiday Inns of America, Inc.,
220 F. Supp. 1 (M.D. Tenn. 1963).
' 1959 Comm'N REPoRT 456.
[V61. 42
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1917, the Supreme Court in Bi&hanan'V Warley;25 held such
ordinances to be in violation.-of thefourteenth amendmerat.
There are several noteworthy aspq.ts to the Buchcqnm cas..
There, the city of Louisy~lle.;maintained an ordinance.prohibiting
non-Caucasians from occupying residences in any block upon which
a greater number of houses were occupied by Caucasians. By the
same token, the ordinance prohibited Caucasians from occupying
houses on blocks where the greater number of houses were occu-
pied by non-Caucasians. Buchanan, a Caucasian who owned land
on a predominantly Caucasian block, signed a contract to sell the
land to Warley, a Negro, the land to be used for purposes of
Warley's personal residence. Warley then refused to-go through with
the sale on the ground that he would be in violation of the Louisville
ordinance. Buchanan brought an action for specific performance,
the issue being the constitutionality of the racial ordinance.
In 1917, when the case came before the Supreme Court of the
United States, the doctrine of "separate but equal," expressed in
Plessy v. Ferguson,2" had been accepted in the fields of publid
transportation and education as satisfying the constitutional reqfuire-
ments of the fourteenth amendment. This doctrine was expressly
rejected in the Buchanan case and Plessy was distingfished not on
grounds of a denial of equal protection, but on due process grounds.
A unanimous court held that the Louisville ordinance violated due
process of law in that it interfered with "the civil right of a white
man to dispose of his property if he saw fit to do so to a person
of color.' 2  It is interesting to contemplate whether the Court
would have reached the same decision at that time if it had been
Buchanan, the owner, who had reneged on the contract of sale-nd
Warley, the purchaser, who sought specific performance, rather than
the other way around. In any case and for whatever reason, the
Buchanan decision, by outlawing racial zoning ordinances at this
comparatively early date, spared the Nation at least some of the
agony that is our inheritance from Plessy v. Ferguson.
B. Restrictive Covenants
The Supreme Court's decision in Buchanan had a peculiar side
effect. What the Court had declared unconstitutional when at-
-- 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
*" 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
27245 U.S. at 81.
1963] %
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tempted through municipal ordinances now began to be effected
through private agreement-the restrictive covenant. Through
this device, property owners could be assured that only persons of
an acceptable race, color, creed, or national origin would live in their
midst.
In 1926, the validity of these covenants was tested for the first
time in the Supreme Court. Corrigan v. Buckley28 involved a suit
to enjoin the violation of a covenant limiting the occupancy of
houses in an area in the District of Columbia to Caucasians. The
covenant was upheld, but the Court did not find it necessary to
reach the question of their judicial enforceability.
In the years following the Corrigan decision, the restrictive
covenant came more and more into use. The creation of the Fed-
eral Housing Administration in 19349 acted as a spur to the
proliferation of these covenants. 0 Finally, in 1948, in the celebrated
case of Shelley v. Kraemer,"1 the Supreme Court settled the im-
portant issue that Corrigan had left unresolved: Were racially re-
strictive covenants judicially enforceable?
The Shelley case arose in 1945 in St. Louis, where the Shelleys,
who were Negroes, purchased property subject to a fifty-year re-
strictive covenant that had been agreed to in 1911. By 1961,
Negroes- and Orientals would have been eligible to own property
there." The Supreme Court held that for the Missouri courts to
enforce the covenant by way of injunction constituted state action
in violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. In answer to the contention that since the state courts stood
equally ready to enforce restrictive covenants excluding white per-
sons there was no denial of equal protection, the Court made a
"S271 U.S. 323 (1926).
" National Housing Act, 48 Stat. 1246 (1934), 12 U.S.C. § 1701 (1958).
" FHA's underwriting manual of 1938 stated: "If a neighborhood is to
retain stability it is necessary that properties shall continue to be occupied
by the same social and racial groups." FHA, UNDERWRITING MANUAL
§ 937 (1938). The manual further recommended the use of restrictive cov-
enants to ensure against inharmonious racial groups and contained a model
covenant. The inclusion of restrictive covenants in real estate sales contracts
became almost a prerequisite to FHA mortgage insurance. See 1961
Comm'N REPORT 16. FHA, in its early years, has been characterized as "a
sort of 'Typhoid Mary' for racial covenants." Id. at 62.
a1334 U.S. 1 (1948).
a, As the Civil Rights Commission has wryly observed: "The Shelleys
were 16 years early." 1961 Comm'N REPORT 24.
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noteworthy and conclusive response: "Equal protection of the laws
is not achieved through indiscriminate imposition of inequalities."33
In a companion case, Hurd v. Hodge,"' involving the en-
forceability of restrictive covenants by federal courts in the District
of Columbia, the Court reached the same decision, but for different
reasons. There were two grounds for the Court's decision. Neither
of them involved the Constitution. First, the Court cited the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, which provides:
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in
every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof
to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real and personal
property. 5
Enforcement of these covenants by federal courts, the Justices
unanimously held, would constitute a denial of rights protected
by this act. Secondly, the Court held that such enforcement would
violate public policy.38
Although the Shelley and Hurd cases, in and of themselves,
had a dramatic effect in discouraging the use of restrictive cov-
enants, 7 several unanswered questions remained in this regard.
One was the matter of the enforceability of restrictive covenants by
way of money damages. Another was the basic question of the
continued viability of the holding in Corrigan, that restrictive cov-
enants were valid. The first question was settled in 1953 in Barrows
v. Jackson,"s where it was held that judicial enforcement by way
of money damages was prohibited. The second question came up
for decision the following year.
3" 334 U.S. at 22.S3 334 U.S. 24 (1948).
14 Stat. 27 (1866), 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1958).
"Although the fourteenth amendment applies, by its terms, only to the
states, the argument was made that the due process clause of the fifth
amendment, which applies to the federal government, embodies the same
protection as the equal protection clause in the fourteenth. The Court did
not find it necessary at this time to decide the point. Six years later, in
Boling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (the District of Columbia school
segregation case), the Court did rely on the fifth amendment for its de-
cision, indicating that the due process clause of the fifth amendment and
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth are coextensive with respect to
racial discrimination.
" In December 1949, FHA announced that it would not provide mort-
gage insurance on property on which restrictive covenants were recorded
after Feb. 15, 1950. Thus, in virtually one step the policy of the FHA
changed from one of insisting on restrictive covenants to prohibiting them.
1959 Comm'x REPORT 463-65.
'p346 U.S. 249 (1953).
19631
NORTH'CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
"John Rice, ;a Winnebago Indian, was 'killed in Korea in the
service of his country. His body was returned home to Sioux City,
Iowa, where his. Ca ucasian- widow made preparations to bury him
in a cemetery plot she had purchased for that purpose. The ceme-
tery management discovered' at the graveside that Rice was an
Indian and refused to permit his burial there. Mrs. Rice sued for
moniey damages and the" cemetery defended on the ground that a re-
strictive covenant prohibited the burial of Indians in the cemetery.
The Iowa Supreme. Court ruled that 'the covenant, although un-
enforceable, was not void and could be relied upon as a defense."9
It was in this posture that the case came to the Supreme Court
of the United States via a writ of certiorari.
By an evenly divided vote, the Court affirmed the judgment of
the Iowa Supreme Court.40  Shortly thereafter, it was brought to
the Court's attention that an Iowa statute had been enacted that
prohibited any future discrimination such as was involved here.
On a petition for rehearing, the Court set aside its order of affirm-
ance and dismissed the writ of certiorari, as improvidently granted.4'
Therefore, the validity of racially restrictive covenants remains ques-
tionable."
C. Federally Assisted Housing
The Supreme Court of the United States has not yet determined
the constitutionality of discrimination or segregation in housing
provided with the aid of any federal housing program. To this
extent, then, the law is by no means settled. Indeed, there is a
general paucity of decisions on this question by any federal court.
To understand the situation one must first look at the programs.
The first is public housing. Pursuant to this program, the
"Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., 245 Iowa 147, 60
N.W.2d 110 (1953).
,oRice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., 348 U.S. 880 (1954).
Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc._349 U.S. 70 (1955).
"One related problem is the effect that a reverter clause has on the
enforceability of restrictive covenants. In Charlotte Park & Recreation
Comm'n v. Barringer, 242 N.C. 311, 88 S.E.2d 114 (1955), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 983 (1956), a covenant with a reverter clause was held judicially
enforceable in that, according to the court, such a covenant creates a de-
terminable fee which "automatically will cease and terminate by its own
limitations." Id. at 322, 88 S.E.2d at 123. Thus, its operation is not byjudicial enforcement. In Capital Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Smith, 136
Colo. 265, 316 P.2d 252 (1957), however, the rule regarding judicial un-
enforceability of racially restrictive covenants was held to apply despite the
presence of a reverter clause.
[Vol. 42
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Public Housing Administration. provides: financial assistancei to
local housing authorities in thi.,development, financifig,. and 'con-
struction of low-rent housing. In addition, this federal agency
makes annual contributions which help to maintain ,the low-rent
character of the projects. The projects are operated by local housing
authorities, which are governmental bodies, and it is their responsi-
bility to determine the sites and occupancy of the projects.
Next is urban renewal. Pursuant to this program, the Urban
Renewal Administration provides financial assistance in the form
of loans and grants to local public agencies, for the purpose of clear-
ing away slums. The local, public agencies, which are state gqv-
ernmental bodies, acquire designated land for clearance, and then
typically dispose of it to private redevelopers -who are required to
build upon the land in accordance with a preordained plan. The
decisions as to sites and plans are made bI,"the local public agency,
with the concurrence of the Urban Renewal Administration. This
program, it should be noted, involves the federal government, state
and local government, and private enterprise.
Finally there is FHA mortgage insurance. Pursuant to this
program, the Federal Housing Administration provides assistance
in the form of insurance of mortgages. These mortgages are
typically long-term (up to 40 years), carry a low rate of interest,
and permit a high loan-to-value ratio. The builder or developer
who utilizes the FHA program must satisfy FHA standards with
respect to plans and specifications. In the past, however, FHA
has concerned itself little with matters of occupancy.
Despite the lack of any utterances by the Supreme Court having
specifically to do with discrimination or segregation in any of these
programs, it seems clear that at least in one (and possibly in the
second and third of these programs) such discrimination or segrega-
tion is in violation of the Constitution.
1. Public Housing.-In connection with public housing, such
discrimination or segregation as may exist is, by the very nature
of the program, governmentally determined and governmentally en-
forced.43  There is no question here of the presence of state action.
"'In Cohen v. Public Housing Administration, 257 F.2d 73, 78 (5th
Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 928 (1959), a distinction was made be-
tween "governmentally enforced segregation," which is forbidden, and
"voluntary segregation for the common good," which, the court indicated
was permissible. In view of the nature of the public housing program, where
it is governmental authority that determines the selection of tenants for par-
1W]I
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It is the state that is acting .(through the tenant selection practices
of the local housing authority) and the responsibility is that of the
state. Two courts of appeals have held that governmentally en-
forced segregation in public housing violates the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment.44 In addition, virtually every
decision on this point since Brown has similarly held such dis-
crimination or segregation to be unlawful.45
2. Urban Renewal.-Until just a few months ago, there had been
no decision on the constitutionality of discrimination in urban re-
newal. In three earlier cases, the urban renewal programs in
Eufaula,4 6 Gadsden,47 and Bessemer, 48 Alabama had come under
attack on the ground that, if consummated, they would result in
residential segregation or the exclusion of the former Negro resi-
dents. All three suits were dismissed as premature. Judges in two
of the three cases, however, felt compelled to deliver themselves of
some pointed remarks on the substantive issues involved. In the
Eufaula case, District Judge Johnson, in holding the suit premature,
said:
[T]his Court must now assume that these defendants [officials of
the Eufaula urban redevelopment authority], their agents and
successors in office, after receiving the federal assistance in this
public project, will, upon a completion of this project (or any
phase of it), recognize the law that is now so clear; this law being
to the effect that there can be no governmentally enforced segre-
gation solely because of race or color.49
ticular projects, the court's term "voluntary segregation" is ambiguous in
meaning.
"Heyward v. Public Housing Administration, 238 F.2d 689 (5th Cir.
1956); Detroit Housing Comm'n v. Lewis, 226 F.2d 180 (6th Cir. 1955).
" See, e.g., Eleby v. Louisville Municipal Housing Comm'n, 2 RAcE Rz_..
L. REP. 815 (W.D. Ky. May 24, 1957) ; Askew v. Benton Harbor Housing
Comm'n, 2 RAcE REL. L. REP. 611, 617 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 21, 1956) ; Davis
v. St. Louis Housing Authority, 1 RAcE REL. L. REP. 353 (E.D. Mo. Dec.
27, 1955); Jones v. City of Hamtramck, 121 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Mich.
1954). See also Banks v. Housing Authority, 120 Cal. App. 2d 1, 260 P.2d
668 (Dist. Ct. App. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 974 (1954), where the
Supreme Court of the United States, one week after it decided the School
Segregation Cases, declined to review the state court's ruling that the doc-
trine of "separate but equal" as applied to public housing was unlawful.
Tate v. City of Eufaula, 165 F. Supp. 303 (M.D. Ala 1958)
Barnes v. City of Gadsden, 268 F.2d 593 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 915 (1959).
"Jimerson v. City of Bessemer, Civil No. 10054, N.D. Ala., August 3,
1962.
" 165 F. Supp. at 306.
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Judge Johnson's dictum seemed to beg the true substantive
question: Granting that governmentally enforced segregation is
prohibited, would segregation by the ultimate redeveloper after he
acquired the urban renewal land from the local governmental body
be attributed to, and deemed to be, governmentally enforced segre-
gation? If Judge Johnson was assuming such attribution, it was
quite an assumption. No rationale was offered to justify holding
the governmental body responsible for discrimination practiced by
the private redeveloper.
In the Gadsden case, Circuit Judge Rives helped to clarify this
point. While concurring with the view of his brethren that the
suit was premature, Judge Rives dissented in part, regarding the
future possibility of discrimination by the private redeveloper. In
his view, the redeveloper would be constitutionally prohibited from
discriminating in that he was carrying out the plan of the local
governmental body. Judge Rives said:
In my opinion, the plan has not been completed until the prop-
erty passes out of the control of the redeveloper, and hence in
disposing of property within either of the areas the redeveloper
may not discriminate between purchasers on the basis of race or
color. We should, I think, follow the course so well outlined
by Judge Johnson... in Tate v. City of Eufaula .... 50
Here was a viable rationale for Judge Johnson's unequivocal
dictum. It remained to be seen whether this rationale, also offered
by way of dictum-and in a dissent, to boot-would be accepted
when the substantive issue of government responsibility for dis-
crimination by a private urban renewal redeveloper was actually
presented. On April 17, 1961, the Supreme Court of the United
States decided Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority.51
If the Brown case served to resolve doubt as to the meaning of
"equality" in fourteenth amendment terms, the Burton case pro-
vides at least a solid basis on which the second issue under that
amendment-government responsibility-can be resolved.
The Wilmington Parking Authority, an agency of the State of
Delaware, erected a parking facility in downtown Wilnington. In
order to secure additional revenue, the Authority leased some of
the premises to private tenants. One such lease was entered into
with Eagle Coffee Shoppe, Inc., for purposes of a restaurant. The
10 268 F.2d at 598.
1365 U.S. 715 (1961).
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Authority obligated itself to install such items as utility connections,
toilets, railings, and connecting stairs, and further agreed to furnish
heat. Eagle spent some $220,000 of its own to make the premises
suitable for a restaurant. Some time after the restaurant opened
for business, Burton, a Negro, having parked his car in the
Authority's parking facility, entered the restaurant and was denied
service.
The case reached the U.S. Supreme Court after the Delaware
Supreme Court had held that Eagle "in the conduct of its business,
is acting in a purely private capacity"52 and is thus insulated from
the force and effect of the fourteenth amendment. The Supreme
Court of the United States reversed, holding specifically that "when
a State leases public property in the manner and for the purpose
shown to have been the case here, the proscriptions of the Four-
teenth Amendment must be complied with by the lessee as certainly
as though they were binding covenants written into the agreement
itself. 53
The Court, citing the Civil Rights Cases, stated as a basic
principle, "private conduct abridging individual rights does no
violence to the Equal Protection Clause unless to some significant
extent the State in any of its manifestations has been found to have
become involved in it."54 It then noted the "benefits mutually con-
ferred" through the operation of the restaurant in a public building
and observed that the Authority could.have required nondiscrimina-
tion in its lease with Eagle. The Court went on:
But no State may effectively abdicate its responsibilities by either
ignoring them or by merely failing to discharge them whatever
the motive may be. . . . By its inaction, the Authority, and
through it the State, has not only made itself a party to the
refusal of service, but has elected to place its power, property
and prestige behind the admitted discrimination. The State has
so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with
Eagle that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the
challenged activity, which, on that account, cannot be considered
to have been so "purely private" as to fall without the scope of
the Fourteenth Amendment.55
157 A.2d 894, 902 (Del. 1960).
h' 365 U.S. at 726.
Id at 722. (Emphasis added.)
.Id. at 725.
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Mr. Justice Clark, speaking for the Court, was careful to limit his
holding to the specific facts of the case presented, thus placing some
doubt on the precedent value of Burton. The thrust of Burton, how-
ever, has not been so limited.
In Hampton v. City of Jacksonville," the city, after having been
enjoined by a court from operating its two golf courses on a racially
segregated basis, sold the courses to private parties. Both convey-
ances contained a reversionary clause assuring that the properties
would be maintained as golf courses. In a suit to enjoin the private
owners from restricting the use of the golf courses to white patrons,
the court held that in view of the continuing control by the city (by
means of the reversionary clause) over the use of the property, "the
purchasers of the two golf courses [are] state agents, within the
purview of the Fourteenth Amendment."
5 7
Chief Judge Tuttle, writing for the Fifth Circuit, took pains to
distinguish two prior decisions by the Fourth Circuit in apparent
conflict with Hampton. In one, Tonkins v. City of Greensboro,58
he pointed out, "there was an outright sale of a swimming pool
without any restriction or reversionary clause of any kind."59  In
the other, Eaton v. Board of James Walker Memorial Hosp., ° the
distinguishing factor was that Burton had intervened. Judge Tuttle
said, "we doubt whether the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit would have decided the Hospital case as it did had it fol-
lowed the Supreme Court decision [in Burton].""
The implications of Burton and its direct descendant, Hampton,
in terms of the urban renewal program, appear conclusive. In
urban renewal, where the entire plan carries a public purpose and
where the uses to which the private redeveloper shall put the
land are dictated by the local governmental body-usually in the
form of covenants running with the land-the involvement of the
state and its continuing control over the land would appear to bring
the redeveloper within the proscriptions of the fourteenth amend-
ment, as it did Eagle, in Burton, and the private golf course owners,
in Hampton.
" 304 F.2d 320 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 911 (1962).
5T Id. at 323.
" 276 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1960).
r' 304 F.2d at 323.6 261 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1958).
,1304 F.2d at 323.
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In Smith v. Holiday Inns of America, Inc.,"2 decided on July
31, 1963, the substantive issue of the constitutionality of discrim-
ination by private parties on urban renewal land, was tested for the
first time. Plaintiff, a Negro dentist from Memphis, attempted
to obtain a room in a Holiday Inn Motel, located in an urban
renewal area in Nashville. He was refused a room on the ground
that "it was the management's policy not to serve Negroes." 8
In an action for a declaratory judgment and an injunction, Federal
District Judge Miller held for the plaintiff. Judge Miller stated
the issue in terms reminiscent of Burton and Hampton:
In view of the numerous and pervasive forms of governmental
participation prior to the execution of the deeds, and the con-
tinuing governmental controls over future uses of the property
which the Housing Authority has reserved in order to fulfill the
public purposes for which the Project was designed and brought
into being, the controlling issue is whether the State or its
agencies have become, and continue to be, involved to such a
significant extent and degree that in the use of the property the
defendants [Holiday Inn] are bound by the Equal Protection
Clause prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of race or
color.6 4
Judge Miller further detailed the extent of governmental control
over the use of the property (including covenants running with
the land to assure compliance with the governmental plan) and said,
in summary: "Extensive involvement by the state, in many and
varied forms and through various agencies, is evident not only in
t he conception, formulation, development, and carrying out of the
overall public plan and project, but also in its continuation and
perpetuation."6  Relying on Burton, the Court held that Holiday
Inn was bound by the constitutional prohibition against discrimina-
tion.6" The case is to be appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
As noted above, the Holiday Inns case is the first decision on
" 220 F. Supp. 1 (M.D. Tenn. 1963).
8 Id. at 2.
61 Id. at 7.
'
3 Id. at 8.
"Two prior cases cited by defendants, Barnes v. City of Gadsden, 268
F.2d 593 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 915 (1959) and Dorsey v.
Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541 (1949), cert. denied,
339 U.S. 981 (1950), were summarily dismissed. The Court held that the
authority of the two cases had been displaced by the ruling of the Supreme
Court in Burton.
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the substantive merits concerning the application of the fourteenth
amendment to a private urban renewal redeveloper. To this ob-
server, Judge Miller's decision appears well-founded, and in view of
the decisions in Burton and Hampton, it carries a sense of in-
evitability. The results of the appeal to the Sixth Circuit will be
eagerly awaited.
3. FHA Mortgage Insurance.-In view of the tremendous im-
portance of the FHA mortgage insurance program to the Nation's
housing supply, and particularly in view of FHA's past policy of
encouraging (and later, acquiescing in) private discrimination, it
is surprising that there have been only a few scattered cases chal-
lenging the constitutionality of such discrimination. In Johnson v.
Levitt & Sons, Inc.,67 the only federal court decision on this ques-
tion, a federal district court, in deciding that the plaintiff Negroes
had no standing to sue in a federal court, refused to hold that FHA
and VA (which operates a loan guarantee program substantially
similar to the FHA mortgage insurance program) were under a
constitutional duty to prevent discrimination in the sale of housing
project properties covered by federal mortgage insurance or guaran-
tees. The court said, however, that FHA and VA "probably''
had the power to prevent such discrimination if they chose to
do so, and that Congress certainly had the power.". In Ming v.
Horgan,9 on the other .hand, a California court held that in view
of the degree of governmental involvement through FHA and VA
programs, the Negro plaintiff had a constitutional right not to be
discriminated against in the sale by a private builder of houses aided
under the FHA and VA programs. To. the argument that Congress
had not required nondiscrimination in the governing statutes the
court replied: "If it be objected that Congress refused to . . . ordain
[nondiscrimination], it must be replied that Congress could not
ordain otherwise . . . .' The court added epigrammatically,
67131 F. Supp. 114 (E.D. Pa. 1955).6 I1d. at 116.
3 RACE RFL. L. RPP. 693 (Super. Ct., Sacramento County, Calif. June
23, 1958).
"oId. at 699. In another case involving FHA and a private developer,
Novick v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 108 N.Y.S.2d 615 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 107
N.Y.S.2d 1016 (App. Div. 1951), the plaintiffs (Caucasians) sought to re-
strain the developer from using the state courts to evict them at the termina-
tion of their lease, because they had invited Negro children on the premises.
The suit was dismissed in that although the facilities of FHA had been used,
the connection with the federal government was not such that would trans-
form Levittown from a private to a public utility. As a private enterprise,
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"when one dips one's hand into the Federal Treasury, a little de-
mocracy necessarily clings to whatever is withdrawn.
71
Both Johnson and Ming were pre-Burton decisions. Read in
the context of their time it would appear that the Johnson decision
rested on more solid ground than Ming. But Ming may well be the
law today. The plaintiffs in Johnson argued that:
[T]he regulation and control exercised by the federal agencies
in Levittown is so extensive, the relationship between the fed-
eral agencies and Levitt so intimate, the federal aid given in this
instance so crucial to the development of a community like
Levittown, and federal involvement in Levitt's determinations
so great that the actions of Levitt must be deemed the acts of
the federal agencies.72
The court answered this contention in conclusive terms:
All these do not, . . . in my opinion, result in making Levitt and
Sons, Inc. of New York, the government of the United States or
a branch or agency of it nor do they make the government of
the United States the builder or developer of the Levittown
project.73
Thus, according to the court, the burden of the Johnson plaintiffs
was an extremely heavy one-to demonstrate either that Levitt was
a branch or agency of the federal government or that the federal
government was, in fact, the builder of the project. Clearly, how-
ever, that burden no longer obtains. According to the Supreme
Court in Burton, the burden is to demonstrate that "to some
significant extent, the State [or federal government] in any of
its manifestations has been found to have become involved." 74
While governmental involvement under the FHA and VA programs
is different in nature, and, perhaps, lesser in degree, than that under
the court indicated, the developer was free to choose to whom he would
rent his houses. But see Abstract Inv. Co. v. Hutchinson, 204 Cal. App. 2d
242, 22 Cal. Rptr. 309 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962), where it was held that a purely
private landlord, having no connection whatsoever with FHA or any other
branch of the federal government, could not use the courts to evict a Negro
month-to-month tenant after due notice of termination of such tenancy, if the
reason for such eviction was the tenant's race.
13 RAcE REL. L. RaP. at 697.
72 131 F. Supp. at 116.
73 Ibid.
7 365 U.S. at 722. See also Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 4 (1958),
where the Supreme Court interpreted state responsibility as necessarily fol-
lowing upon "state participation through any arrangement, management,
funds, or property."
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the urban renewal program, it may well be of sufficient significance
(in post-Burton terms) to bring the federally aided builder within
the constitutional proscription against discrimination.
From the above discussion of the relevant decisions, it can be
seen that the law concerning the constitutional protection against
housing discriminati6n is still" largely in a state of development.
In several critical areas the synthesis is far from complete. Thus,
the constitutional duty of government-state and federal-to take
appropriate action to assure equal housing opportunity is corre-
spondingly uncertain. The power of government to take such
action, however, even in the absence of a constitutional duty to
do so, is a separate matter. Many states have responded to the
problems of housing discrimination within their borders through
fair housing legislation. In addition, the President, through the
Executive Order on Equal Opportunity in Housing,7 has under-
taken to meet the problem on a national basis. The remainder of
this article will be devoted to an evaluation of the measures taken-
their validity and their limitations-and a brief discussion of
possible further action in this regard.
IIL. THE STATE, RESPONSE
One of the most significant political phenomena of the post-
World War II years has been the series of enactments of state
legislation dealing with housing discrimination. Begining in the
early 1950's, the pace of such'Ilegislation has accelerated to the point
Where nineteen states and the Virgin Islands now maintain some
form of fair housing law. 6 These laws can be conveniently divided
into two groups: Those limited to, public housing, urban renewal,
or both; and those which extend to the private (non-publicly
assisted) market. .In the first group are Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Michigan, Montana, Rhode Island, Washington,7 7 and Wisconsin.
In-the second group are Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
MKissachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New,
' Exec. Order No. 11063,'27 Fed. Reg. 11527 (1962).
i For -a collection of the various state and local' fair housing laws see
HHFA, STATE STATUTES AND LOCAL ORDINANCES AND RESOLUTIONS
PFRAIBITING DIscRImINATION IN EOUSING AND URBAN RENEWAL OpEiA-
TIONS (1961).
'. ' The Wasliington 'State Fair Hbusing Law,'limited to housing provided
with public assistance was declared unconstitutional in O'Meara v. Wash-'
ington State Bd. Against Discrimination, 58 Wash. 2d' 793, 365 P.2d 1
(1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 839 (1962). )
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York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and the Virgin Islands.78  It is note-
worthy that all twelve jurisdictions that maintain broad fair housing
laws extending to the private housing market have enacted them
within the last six years.
A. Constitutionality of Fair Housing Laws
State fair housing laws have been the subject of considerable
litigation testing their constitutionality. The laws of New York,7"
New Jersey,"0 Washington,"' and California8 2 were challenged at
a time when they applied only to publicly assisted (FHA and VA)
housing. s3  In addition, the laws of Connecticut,84 Colorado," and
Massachusetts, 6 as applied to private (non-publicly assisted)
housing, have received similar court tests. The only state fair
housing law that has failed the test of constitutionality has been that
of the state of Washington.
In O'Meara v. Washington State Bd. Against Discrimination,7
the Washington Supreme Court, in a five to four decision, held
that the state law, limited to publicly assisted housing (including
FHA and VA assisted housing), violated both the state and federal
constitutions, as applied to the discriminatory sale of a single-family
8In addition, the cities of Pittsburgh and New York have enacted fair
housing ordinances" covering private (non-publicly assisted) housing. In
the past, the laws of a number of states, including New York, New Jersey,
and California, extended only to publicly assisted housing (including FHA
and VA assisted housing). These laws have all been extended to cover
private (non-publicly assisted) housing.
' New York State Comm'n Against Discrimination v. Pelham Hall
Apartments, Inc., 170 N.Y.S.2d 750 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
8Levitt & Sons, Inc. v. Division Against Discrimination, 31 N.J'. 514,
158 A.2d 177, appeal dismissed,'363 U.S. 418 (1960).
81 O'Meara v. Washington State Bd. Against Discrimination, 58 Wash.
2d 793, 365 P.2d 1 (1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 839 (1962).
82 Burks v. Poppy Constr. Co., 57 Cal. 2d 463, 370 P.2d 313 (Sup. Ct.,
1962).
8 The New Jersey statute received a particularly thorough judicial going
over, being challenged first on equal protection grounds, Levitt & Sons, Inc.
v. Division Against Discrimination, 31 N.J. 514, 158 A.2d 177, appeal dis-
missed, 363 U.S. 418 (1960), and then on due process grounds, Jones v.
Haridor Realty Corp., 37 N.J. 384, 181 A.2d 481 (1962).
8 Commission on Civil Rights v. Swanson, 6 RAcE REL. L. Rxp. 345
(Super. Ct. New Haven County, Conn. July 11, 1961).
8 Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Case, 380 P.2d 34 (Colo.
1962).
" Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination v. Colangelo, 182
N.E.2d 595 (Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. 1962).
858 Wash. 2d 793, 365 P.2d 1 (1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 839
(1962).
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home previously aided through FHA mortgage insurance. There
were two grounds for the majority's decision. First, the court
reasoned that since the defendant had purchased his house with
FHA aid prior to the enactment of the state law, "it can hardly
be argued that he voluntarily assumed any limitations at the time
he obtained the loan.""8 Secondly, the court ruled that a law limited
to publicly assisted housing, and excluding private housing, consti-
tutes an unreasonable classification in violation of (among other
things) the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.8 9
Two of the five judges voting against validity wrote a con-
curring opinion, arguing that there were more basic objections to
the law." It is significant that the four dissenters and three of the
five majority judges appeared to be in accord on at least one point:
A fair housing law applying equally to all housing-publicly as-
sisted and private-would survive the test of constitutionality.
Neither the O'Meara decision nor its reasoning has been followed
in other jurisdictions.91
B. Coverage and Enforcement
As indicated above, the various states that have seen fit to
enact some form of fair housing law have differed widely in
terms of coverage. Some have limited their laws to assure non-
discrimination only in public housing." The courts have already
given strong indication that anything less is in violation of -the
Constitution." Others have extended their laws to include urban
renewal activities."4 Twelve jurisdictions, however, have attempted
to cover the private housing market.
Even within the latter group there is a considerable divergence
in terms of the statutory approach and the means provided for
implementation. New Hampshire and the Virgin Islands take
88 Id. at 799, 365 P.2d af4.--
" The court said: "There is no reason to suppose that persons with
FHA mortgages on their h6mes are more likely to discriminate against
minority groups than those who have conventional mortgages or no mort-
gages, or those who are purchasing upon contract .... The classification
is arbitrary and capricious and bears no reasonable relation to the evil which-
is sought to be eliminated." Id. at 799, 365 P.2d at 5.
o Id. at 799-806, 365 P.2d at 6-9. " . .
"
1Burks v. Poppy Constr. Co., 57 Cal. 2d 463, 370 P.2d 313 (S h. Ct.
1962); Jones v. Haridor Realty Corp., 37 N.J. 384, 181 A.2d 481 (1962).'
" Idaho, Michigan, and Rhode Island.
See notes 44-45 supra.
Illinois, Indiana, Montana, Wisconsin.
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the blanket approach of outlawing discrimination in wholesale
terms. Little consideration, however, is given in these laws to
matters of enforcement, nor do they spell out the kinds of trans-
actions covered. Oregon takes the interesting approach of pro-
hibiting housing discrimination by any "person engaged in the
business of selling [or leasing] real property."95  Thus, the prob-
lem is attacked not in terms of housing units covered, but in terms
of members of the housing industry. States such as New York and
Massachusetts have attempted to spell out coverage in detail, in
terms of the parties, kinds of transactions, and housing units
covered."'
All jurisdictions except New Hampshire and the Virgin Islands
provide for administrative enforcement of their fair housing laws.
In addition, Massachusetts has provided for court injunctions de-
signed to keep the housing unit which is the subject of a complaint
available pending a disposition of the matter.
C. Effect
Fair housing laws have had no apparent revolutionary effect,
either in terms of hampering the housing industry or in bringing'
about truly integrated housing. The dire predictions that greeted
the enactment of some of these laws97 have not come true,9 s nor has
the millennium of universal open occupancy been achieved. Perhaps
the most significant impact thus far has resulted from the simple fact
that these laws constitute an official posture against housing dis-
crimination. As the United States Commission on Civil Rights
was told, concerning the short-range effect of the New York City
law, "outright discrimination has gone underground in New York
City because the law and the positive declarations of our municipal
9 5 ORE. REV. STAT. § 659.033 (1959).
' For a detailed discussion of the scope and effect of the various fair hous-
ing laws see Robison, supra note 4. See also HHFA, op. cit. supra note 76.
'" For example, when the New York City law was pending, the Real'
Estate Board of New York ran an advertisement in the New York Times.
contending: "This proposed law, we genuinely believe will do more harm'
to racial relationships than anything else conceivably could. The proposed
law would cause many more families to leave the city. Would depress real
estate values. Would affect the basis of the City's 'taxation and its credit.
Would undo much of the success we've had in, amicable living." N.Y.
Times, July 29, 1957, p. 8, col. 5.
" Washington Hearings 222, 224.
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policy have taught our citizens that discrimination can have no
acceptance in our daily affairs."99
These laws are comparatively new and many have already
undergone considerable amendment 00 for purposes of making them
more effective. Their full impact undoubtedly lies in the future, as
experience is gained and the educational process of which they are
a part bears fruit.
D. Grass Roots Activities
Accompanying the accelerated pace of state fair housing laws
has been the rapid development of direct action groups by private
citizens on the local level, to aid in the struggle for equal rights.
In 1960, the National Committee Against Discrimination in Hous-
ing identified eighteen independent local groups throughout the
country working to stabilize old neighborhoods or to open new
ones. By early 1963, 250 such groups were identified. These fair
housing groups follow no set pattern, nor are they typically tied
to any national or "outside" organization. As one observer ex-
plained it: "These committees are a classic example of grassroots
initiative, formed entirely by individual residents of the localities
in which they operate."'
Their activities include "Welcome Neighbor" pledge-signing
campaigns to assure acceptance in the neighborhood of minority
home-seekers, the operation of listing services for open housing, and
neighborhood stabilization efforts to maintain existing integrated
patterns. The geographic spread of these groups is impressive.
They are active in .such cities across the country as Boston, San
Francisco, Chicago, Los Angeles, Baltimore, Cleveland, Washing-
ton, D.C., Seattle and Philadelphia. In the Greater New York City
area alone more than seventy-five such groups have been identified.
There has been no indication as to the existence of any fair housing
group in the South.
Nineteen states have enacted fair housing laws. They are, by
and large, heavily populated states in which a large percentage of
the Nation's minority .group members live. They are generally
'9 1959 Comm'N REPORT 401.10 For example, in 1963 alone, New York, Massachusetts, New Jersey,
Connecticut; California, and Alaska strengthened their fair housing, laws by
amendment.
"'Address by Francis Levenson, National Comm. Against Discrimina-
tion in Housing, Nationwide Conference, April 25-26, 1963.
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indnstriaLstates..containing many of our great urban centers. They
are all in the North. It is quite apparent, therefore, at least under
present conditions, that these fair housing laws, even if they prove
entirely successful, are inadequate to meet the national problem of
housing discrimination. The problem is not sectional in scope;
it exists in virtually all of the fifty states. The response of the
states has been a northern response. In not a single instance has
the official response of a southern state to the existence of housing
discrimination within its borders risen above the level of neutrality.
Is it entirely fanciful to expect a more affirmative state response
from that section of the Nation than opposition or neutrality?
To a national problem, there must be a national response. The
approach through state legislation and local grassroots activities,
both of which continue to flourish at least in the northern part of
the country, may ultimately prove to be the most salutary. But
the federal government, which for many years has supported the
nation's housing structure and ignored the discriminatory use of
its housing programs, has at last bestirred itself to action.
IV. THE FEDERAL RESPONSE
A. Federal Impact on Housing
In the last thirty years, housing has become a matter of primary
national concern and the federal government, responding to this
concern, has become increasingly involved in it by way of subsidy
and overall support of the housing industry.102 During the early
years of the New Deal, federal housing programs had as their chief
objectives the alleviation of unemployment conditions and the revital-
ization of the Nation's credit machinery. The tools that were forged
for these purposes during those early days have remained largely
unchanged, but they have been put to a new purpose. Congress, in
1949, proclaimed a national housing objective: "a decent home and
a suitable living environment for every American family."' 1  The
agencies and programs already at hand geared themselves to accom-
plish this objective. President Kennedy observed several months
after taking office that the achievement of this objective is a pledge
to the American people. As he further observed, "we must still
..
2 For a concise history of federal housing programs and of the develop-
ment of federal policy concerning discrimination in housing see 1961 CoMM'N.
REPoRT 9-26.108 63 Stat. 413 (1949), 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1958).
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redeem this pledge."'0 4  He added more pointedly a year later:
"It is clear now, as it was then [in 1949] that this objective cannot
be fulfilled as long as some Americans are denied equal access to
the housing market because of their race or religion."' 0 5
Federal housing programs are almost exclusively concerned with
supplying or facilitating housing credit. Only rarely does the
federal government become involved in the actual construction or
sale of houses. Typically, it operates through the private housing
industry or through local housing authorities to accomplish the pur-
pose of filling the housing needs of the American people.
In addition to the programs previously discussed,' the federal
government also provide assistance to the Nation's home financing
institutions (savings and loan institutions and commercial and mutual
savings banks) in three additional ways: chartering, insurance of
accounts, and maintenance of nationwide Systems of low-interest
credit available to these institutions.T
In terms of assuring equal access to housing provided with the
aid of its programs, the federal impact on housing, until recently,
was hardly profound. By 1962, however, it had progressed to the
point where the official policy of the federal government was to
encourage (if not insist upon) open occupancy in the use of its
programs. On November 20, 1962, the President issued his
Executive Order on Equal Opportunity in Housing08 and the policy
of equal housing opportunity toward which the federal -government
had been slowly moving, became firmly established.
B. The Executive Order on Housing
1. Validity.-The Constitution vests in the President "the
executive Power." It further commands that the President "shall
take care that the laws be faithfully executed." It has been observed
that "the President is entitled to claim broad powers under his duty
to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed.' "'09 Nonetheless,
there are limits on his exercise of these "broad powers." Foremost
10, President Kennedy's Special Message on Housing and Community
Development, 107 CoNG. REc. 3408 (1961).
.0 Washington Hearings 12.
10. See pp. 114-15 supra.
"
07 For a detailed analysis of the relationship between the federal govern-
ment and these lending institutions, see 1961 Comm'x REPORT 27-53.
""
8Exec. Order No. 11063, 27 Fed. Reg, 11527 (1962).
10 CoRwiN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND Pownas. 104 (4th rev. ed.
1957).
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among them is "the well-settled rule that an Executive order, or any
other Executive action, whether by 'formal order or by regulation,
cannot contravene an Act of Congress that is constitutional."11
As Mr. Justice Jackson put it in his celebrated concurring opinion
in the Steel Seizure case,'11 the President's "power is at its lowest
ebb" when he "takes measures incompatible with the expressed or
implied will of Congress.""' 2 By the same token, the Justice pointed
out that "when the President acts pursuant to an express or implied
authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum for it
includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress
can delegate.""'  There is also a middle area-"a zone of twilight"
-where, according to Justice Jackson's formulation, the absence
of Congressional legislation may "enable, if not invite" independent
executive action." 4
In recent years, Congress has been legislatively silent on matters
of nondiscrimination in housing." 5 The various enactments re-
lating to federal housing programs have contained no specific non-
discrimination requirements. There is, as previously noted, how-
ever, an overall legislative policy incorporated by Congress as our
national housing objective-"a decent home and a suitable living
environment for every American family." There is no place in
this language for restrictions based upon race. In addition, Con-
gress, in a statute first enacted almost one hundred years ago, has
11. House Comm. on Gov't Operations, Executive Orders and Proclanta-
tions: A Study of A Use of Presidential Powers, Committee Print, 85th
Cong., 1st Sess. 9 n.18 (1957).
... Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
11: Id. at 637.
"1 Id. at 635.
111,4Id. at 637.
." It has been 'suggested by some that the failure of Congress to adopt
proposed nondiscrimination amendments to housing legislation speaks against
such action being taken by the Executive. See, e.g., Palmer, An, Analysig'
of the Authority of the President to Issue an Executive Order Concerning
Racial Integration in Federal Housing Programs, 108 CONG. REc. 21684,
(1962) (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1962). This suggestion, however, fails to appreci-
ate the well established principle that the "rejection of legislation by Con-
gress cannot be viewed as equivalent to the enactment of legislation of an
opposite tenor." Taylor, Actions in Equity by the U.S. to Enforce School
Desegregation, 29 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 539, 542 (1961). See Gemsco, Inc.
v. Walling, 324 U.S. 244, 265 (1945); United States v. South-Eastern
Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). In Ming v. Horgan, 3 RAcE
REL. L. REP. 693, 699 (Super. Ct., Sacramento County, Calif. June 23,;
1958), the court stated: "If it be objected that Congress refused to ...
oidain' [nondiscrimination], it must be replied that Congress could not ordain
otherwise ......
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legislated a national policy specifically relating to equal housing
opportunity."' Thus, Congress has not been silent on this matter.
Its expressions in this regard would appear to constitute at least
"implied authorization" (to use Justice Jackson's term) for the
President to act.
Nor does such authority derive from policies expressed by Con-
gress alone. The Supreme Court of the United States has stated
that housing discrimination is "contrary to the public policy of the
United States."" 7 This public policy is of such force that in Hurd
v. Hodge,"" the Court prohibited a lower federal court from en-
forcing a private discriminatory agreement on the ground, inter
alia, that such enforcement "would be violative of that policy."" 9
The authority-if not the duty-of the President to carry out
this policy, expressed both by the legislative and judicial branches
of government, appears manifest. The true question, I submit, is
not whether the President has sufficient legal authority to direct his
executive departments and agencies to assure nondiscriminatory
access to housing provided with their aid, but rather, the extent
and manner in which he should, as a matter of policy, utilize the
authority that is clearly his.
2. Scope and Limitations.-The President's Executive order
is a limited one. This is true in at least two senses. For one thing
the principal thrust of the order, as set forth in section 101, relates
almost entirely to housing and related facilities that are hereafter
(after November 20, 1962) provided with federal financial assist-
ance. 2° Thus, federally-assisted housing already built and occupied
' ' See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
1
.Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 34 (1948).
118334 U.S. 24 (1948).
11 Id. at 34.
"' Exec. Order No. 11063, 27 Fed. Reg. 11527, § 101 (1962), directs that
"all action necessary and appropriate" be taken to prevent discrimination
with respect to housing and related facilities that are (a) "(i) owned or
operated by the Federal Government" or are assisted by the federal govern-
ment in any of the following ways:
"(ii) provided in whole or in part with the aid of loans, advances, grants,
or contributions hereafter agreed to be made by the Federal Government, or
(iii) provided in whole or in part by loans hereafter insured, guaranteed,
or otherwise secured by the credit of the Federal Government, or (iv) pro-
vided by the development or the redevelopment of real property purchased,
leased, or otherwise obtained from a State or local public agency receiving
Federal financial assistance for slum clearance or urban renewal with respect
to such real property under a loan or grant contract hereafter entered
into .... ." (Emphasis added.)
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before the date of the order's issuance is outside the scope of
section 101.121 Moreover, it is to be noted that in connection with
several federal housing programs (notably public housing and urban
renewal) there is a considerable time lag between the granting of
federal financial aid and the ultimate construction and occupancy
of the housing so aided. The critical cut-off date for purposes
of section 101, however, is the date on which the financial assistance
is agreed to be made, not the date on which the housing is con-
structed or occupied, nor even the date on which money changes
hands. In the case of public housing, the cut-off point is the date
on which the Annual Contributions Contract (providing for future
federal subsidies to the public housing project) is executed. In
the case of urban renewal, it is the date on which the Loan and
Capital Grant Contract (providing for future slum clearance assist-
ance) is executed. 3 In both cases years will usually elapse before
the housing is actually constructed and occupied. Thus, if an An-
nual Contributions Contract or Loan and Capital Grant Contract
had been executed on November 19, '1962 (one day before issuance
of the Executive order), the command of nondiscrimination would
be inapplicable with respect to the housing built well after that
date pursuant to the contract. Consequently, for several years to
come, we may well witness the continued discriminatory sale or
occupancy, not only of existing housing built or sold with pre-
Executive order federal aid, but also of housing yet to be con-
structed.
The order, however, may prove to be sufficiently flexible to offset
this disappointing prospect. Section 102, which addresses itself
to housing and related facilities heretofore provided with federal
financial assistance, directs the relevant departments and agencies
"to use their good offices and to take other appropriate action per-
mitted by law, including the institution of appropriate litigation, if
required, to promote the abandonment of discriminatory prac-
'21 Except, of course, for housing that is federally owned or operated.
12. The Public Housing Administration requires that a nondisciimination
provision be inserted in all contracts for annual contributions which initially
cover a public housing project or projects after Nov. 20, 1962. See Circular
from Public Housing Commissioner Marie .C. McGuire to Central Office
Division and Branch Heads, Regional Directors, Local Authorities, and
Housing Managers, Nov. 28;1962.
12. See Local Public Agency Letter No. 256, from Urban Renewal Com-
missioner William L. Slayton, Nov. 30, 1962.
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tices ... "124 Accompanying the olive branch of "good offices,"
then, is the more formidable instrument-"other appropriate ac-
tion." Litigation is offered as an example of appropriateness. Thus
far, it has been the olive branch aspect of the "good offices" section
that has been utilized, but the "other appropriate action" instrument
remains available.
In addition, the decisional law concerning the constitutionality
of discrimination in federally assisted housing appears to be de-
veloping in such a way that virtually all federally aided housing,
regardless of when it was built or aided, may soon come under
the constitutional prohibition against discrimination. In public
housing, this constitutional prohibition appears to exist already. 2 5
In urban renewal, the first decision by a federal court has come
down,'26 and it has found the prohibition to apply. Furthermore,
the constitutionality of discrimination by FHA or VA-aided builders
and developers, after the Burton, Hampton, and Holiday Inns de-
cisions, is in serious doubt. Thus, the Constitution may well
render sections 101 and 102 indistinguishable in terms of the
command of nondiscrimination.
The second shortcoming of the Executive order-one which
cannot, in all probability, be cured except by amendment-relates
to the limited kinds of federal assistance made subject to its pro-
visions. While the order is addressed generally to "all departments
and agencies in the executive branch of the Federal Government,"' 127
its command of nondiscrimination affects only a fraction of the home
financing in which federal agencies play a part. The major in-
adequacy is that federally supervised mortgage lending instilutions
are affected only to the extent that they engage in FTA and VA
loans. 2' The bulk of their home financing activities is outside the
scope of the Executive order. The institutions concerned are com-
mercial banks, mutual savings banks, and savings and loan associa-
.' Exec. Order No. 11063, 27 Fed. Reg. 11527, § 102 (1962). (Emphasis
added.)
' See notes 44-45 supra.
... Smith v. Holiday Inns of America, Inc., 220 F. Supp. 1 (M.D. Tenn.
1963).
"" Exec. Order No. 11063, 27 Fed. Reg. 11527, § 101 (1962).
.
28Exec. Order No. 11063, 27 Fed. Reg. 11527, § 101(b) (1962) directs
that action be taken to prevent discrimination "in the lending practices with
respect to residential property and related facilities (including land to be
developed for residential use) of lending institutions insofar as such prac-
tices relate to loans hereafter insured or guaranteed by the Federal Govern-
ment."
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tions. They command, in the aggregate, resources of more
than $400 billion. They also represent the major source of the
"conventional" (non-FHA or VA) mortgage market, and it is, in
fact, through them that most of the Nation's home financing is
done. Virtually all of these institutions receive substantial federal
benefits and are subject to federal regulation and supervision.' To
the extent that these federally supervised institutions engage in home
financing, the President would appear to have the power (as in the
case of other federally aided housing activities) to direct the federal
agencies that supervise and regulate the activities of these institu-
tions to assure that they follow nondiscriminatory policies and prac-
tices in this regard.1 30  Although it has not been judicially deter-
mined that a duty to require such nondiscrimination exists,181 the
power to do so rests on a firm constitutional basis.'
3. Effect-Present and Future.-Having noted the various
limitations of the Executive order in terms of scope and coverage, it
must nonetheless be said that it is a document of profound im-
portance. For its true significance lies not so much in its coverage,
nor in the number of housing units affected, but in the splendid fact
that it was issued. For the first time, that branch of our government
whose responsibility it is to execute the laws has assumed a firm
and nationwide posture in favor of equal housing opportunity for
all. Furthermore, it possesses the means to make a significant
contribution to this end.
As in the case of state fair housing laws and the grassroots
activities of private citizens on the local level, truly tangible results
undoubtedly lie well in the future. Although law can affect be-
havior, changes in attitudes-indeed, in hearts and minds-require
also time and a process of education. But law is necessary, for
... For a discussion of the importance of federally supervised lending
institutions in home financing and the extent of their supervision and regu-
lation by federal agencies, see Sloane & Freedman, The Executive Order
on Housing: The Constitutional Basis for What it Fails to Do, 9 How.
L.J. 1, 5-9 (1963).
... In June 1961, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, of its own accord,
adopted a policy opposing discrimination by the institutions under its super-
vision (savings and loan associations). In addition, the Board expressed
the intention of implementing this policy through examination. See 1961
Comm'N REPORT 36. No information has been made public as to the
effect of the Board's policy statements, nor the success of its implementation.
... No cases have been brought to the author's attention bearing on this
issue.2' See Sloane & Freedman, supra note 129.
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it is an essential ingredient of this educational process. Thus, the
Executive Order on Housing represents a national response to a
nationwide problem. Through it and other actions taken in the
overall civil rights area, there is reason to hope that the Nation-
North and South-can cease expending its resources and its energies
on an issue that, in all morality and conscience, should not be with
US.
